Abstract: Scoring rules are compared by their equilibria in simple voting games with Poisson population uncertainty, using new techniques for computing pivot probabilities. Best-rewarding rules like plurality voting can generate discriminatory equilibria where the voters disregard some candidate as not a serious contender, although he may be universally liked, or symmetric to other candidates as in the Condorcet cycle. Such discriminatory equilibria are eliminated by worst-punishing rules like negative voting, but then even a universally disliked candidate may have to be taken seriously. In simple bipolar elections, equilibria are always majoritarian and efficient under approval voting, but not other scoring rules.
Introduction
When there are only two alternatives in an election, the meaning of majority rule seems clear and straightforwardly implementable. But when voters have to select among three or more alternatives, there are many different voting rules that can be used. The impossibility theorems of social choice theory show that no ideal voting rule can extend the definition of majority rule by a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in all social choice situations (Muller and Satterthwaite [4] ). To move beyond such impossibilities, we should now study how the sets of equilibrium outcomes in an election may be systematically affected by changes in the voting rule.
This paper considers simple examples of social choice situations that illustrate some of the fundamental ways that voting reform can change rational voting behavior. To keep things simple, most of this paper focuses on winner-take-all elections in which there are just three alternative candidates, but some simple elections with more candidates are considered in Section 8. These simple examples show how different voting rules can systematically yield very different sets of equilibria. Some rules (like plurality voting) tend to generate a wide multiplicity of nonsymmetric equilibria, and can have symmetric equilibria in which the election may be lost by a majority bloc of voters when it has duplicate candidates. Other rules (like negative voting) tend to generate fewer nonsymmetric equilibria, but can have symmetric equilibria in which the election is won by a minority bloc of voters that has duplicate candidates. The size of the equilibrium set has political significance because a larger multiplicity of equilibria creates a wider scope for focal manipulation by political leaders, as discussed in [10] . In this paper, we find a better mix of majoritarian and multiplicity properties in the equilibrium sets of some intermediate voting rules (like approval voting). 3 The voting rules considered in this paper are all scoring rules. In a scoring rule, each voter's ballot must be a vector that specifies the number of points that the voter gives to each candidate. The vote vectors of all voters are summed, and the winning candidate has the most points. In case of a tie for the most points, we assume that a winner is chosen randomly among those with the most points, each with equal probability.
In a model of three-candidate elections where the candidates are numbered {1,2,3}, a vote In an (A,B)-scoring rule, each voter must choose a vote vector that is a permutation of either (1,B,0) or (1,A,0). That is, the voter must give a maximum of 1 point to one candidate, a minimum of 0 points to some other candidate, and A or B points to the remaining candidate.
The set of (A,B) pairs that satisfy 0 # A # B # 1 can be represented as a triangle (as shown in Following the terminology of Cox [2, 3] , the scoring rules where (A,B) is near (0,0) may be called best-rewarding rules, because the most important aspect of any voter's ballot is which candidate has been ranked as "best" to get the maximum of 1 point, as the other candidates both get close to 0 points. In contrast, the scoring rules where (A,B) is near (1,1) may be called worst-punishing rules, because the most important aspect of any voter's ballot is which candidate has been ranked as "worst"
to get the minimum of 0 points, as the other candidates both get close to 1 point. Borda and approval voting are balanced between these best-rewarding and worst-punishing extremes, but approval voting differs from Borda voting on a dimension of flexibility.
In Section 4, we show that best-rewarding rules tend to generate many discriminatory equilibria in which the voters disregard some candidate as not a serious contender, possibly even a candidate who would be widely preferred. In Section 5, we show that such discriminatory equilibria can be eliminated by worst-punishing rules, but then even a universally disliked candidate may have to be taken seriously in equilibrium. In Section 6, we characterize the voting rules that yield discriminatory equilibria in the Condorcet cycle, thus breaking the symmetry of this example which has been central in proofs of impossibility theorems. Section 7 considers symmetric equilibria of bipolar elections and shows that majoritarian outcomes can be guaranteed only by approval voting. Section 8 shows that this majoritarianism and efficiency of approval voting can be extended to all equilibria of more general bipolar elections. 5 The analysis of voting games in this paper is based on the assumption that voters are instrumentally motivated, that is, that each voter chooses his ballot to maximize the utility that he gets from the election, which is assumed to depend only on which candidate wins the election. This assumption seems natural and realistic, but it implies that each voter cares about his choice of ballot only in the event that his ballot could pivotally change the outcome of the election. So this theory of rational voting necessarily implies that voters' decisions may depend on the relative probabilities of various ways that one vote may be pivotal in the election, even though these pivot probabilities may be very small in a large election.
Under plurality voting, for example, voters often choose to vote for their second-favorite candidate rather than their favorite candidate. This phenomenon occurs when the probability of their favorite candidate being in a close race (where a vote could make a difference) is much smaller than the probability of their second-favorite candidate being in a close race with their worst candidate, in which case it would be a waste to not vote for their second-favorite candidate. Such wasted-vote effects can be very important in equilibria under best-rewarding voting rules like plurality voting.
So to characterize rational equilibria with instrumental voters, we need a formal procedure to identify which pairs of candidates are more likely to be in a close race where one vote could determine the winner. Myerson and Weber [10] made some simple assumptions about how the serious races might be determined, given any pattern of anticipated voting strategies, but we will see an example (in Section 6) where the assumptions of that paper appear to be inconsistent with any reasonable probability model. To avoid the such pitfalls, the simple assumptions about serious races in [10] should be replaced by calculations based on some formal probability model. 6 Unfortunately, it can be very difficult to calculate the probabilities of these close-race events, where two candidates' scores are within one vote of each other and are ahead of all the other candidates. I have argued elsewhere [7, 9] that the difficulty of these probability calculations can be minimized by assuming a Poisson model of population uncertainty, in which there is uncertainty about the numbers of each type of voter, and beliefs about these numbers can be characterized by independent Poisson random variables.
So Poisson models are applied here to quantify all probabilities in our analysis. The general
Poisson model is described in Section 2, and the calculus of Poisson probability magnitudes is presented in Section 3. The advantage of the Poisson model is only that it gives us a precise and tractable framework for seeing how beliefs about outcome probabilities and rational voting behavior can fit together in a logically consistent way under a wide variety of voting rules. The most important conclusions of our analysis here are, not the specific quantitative probabilities that may be computed for any one equilibrium, but the more general qualitative ways that these equilibria may change when the voting rule is changed. (See [9] for an argument that other Multinomial models should yield qualitatively similar results.)
General definitions
In a general social choice situation, we may let K denote the set of candidates (or alternatives) in the election. One candidate in K must be chosen as winner in the outcome of any voting game. In models of three-candidate elections, we let K = {1,2,3}.
Each voter has a type that determines his (or her) preferences over the candidates. We let T 7 denote the set of voters' possible types. We assume here that voters have independent private values for the candidates, and so the preferences of a type t voter can described by a utility vector u(t) = (u (t)) , where u (t) is the utility payoff to each voter of type t if candidate i wins the election.
The expected distribution of voters in the electorate is denoted by a probability distribution r = (r(t)) , where r(t) denotes the probability that any randomly sampled voter will have type t. This t0T given distribution r must satisfy r(t) $ 0 oet0T, and 3 r(s) = 1.
s0T
The expected number of voters is denoted here by the parameter n. In our Poisson models of population uncertainty, we assume that the actual number of voters participating in the election will be a
Poisson random variable with mean n, and each voters' type will be independently drawn from T according to the probability distribution r. A Poisson distribution has a standard deviation that is the square root of its mean. So if the expected number of voters is 100,000,000, then the Poisson assumption implies uncertainty about this population with a standard deviation of 10,000. (Extended Poisson models with more uncertainty are formulated in [8] .)
These parameters (K, T, u, r, n) then characterize a social choice situation with Poisson population uncertainty. Then to complete the definition of a voting game, we must specify the voting rule. In general, we may let C denote the set of ballot options from which each voter must choose. In the scoring rules that we study here, these ballot options are vote vectors of the form c = (c ) , where
c denotes the number of points that a voter is giving to candidate i when the voter chooses ballot c in i the election. These parameters (K, T, u, r, n, C) then completely characterize a voting game with expected population size n. 8 A strategy function for the voters in such a voting game is any mapping F from T into the set of probability distributions over C. That is, a strategy function F will specify, for each type t in T and each ballot option c in C, a number F(c*t) denoting the probability that a voter of type t would choose ballot c in the election. Any strategy function F must satisfy F(c*t) $ 0, oec0C, and 3 F(d*t) = 1, oet0T.
d0C
When the voters behave according to the strategy function F, the probability that any randomly sampled voter will cast the ballot c is [7] ). Thus, when the expected vote profile is nJ = (nJ(c)) , the probability c0C that any x in Z(C) will be the actual vote profile in the election is
Another noteworthy property of the Poisson model is that any single voter in the election should assess this same probability distribution P(C*nJ) for the vote profile that will be generated by all the other voters in the election, counting everyone's ballots except his own. (This property is called environmental equivalence in [7] .)
When the vote profile is x, the winner will be a candidate with the most points, in the set
Assuming random selection in ties, the probability of i winning given a vote profile x is
Given any expected vote profile nJ, the corresponding probability distribution over the winner of the election may then be denoted by q = (q(i)) , where each i0K (2) q(i) = 3 P(x*nJ) Q(i*x). should want to choose the ballot option c that maximizes his expected utility
So we may say that (F,J,q) is an equilibrium of the voting game with expected size n iff J and q are the expected vote distribution and win probability distribution corresponding to F (as in equations (1) and (2)) and, for each c in C and each t in T,
F(c*t) > 0 implies that c 0 argmax
We consider here only equilibria in which weakly dominated actions have been eliminated for all types. That is, any type t should assign zero probability in equilibrium to a ballot option c if there exists some other ballot option d in C such that
, oex0Z(C), with strict inequality for some x.
In an (A,B)-scoring rule, dominance implies that a voter with independent private values should give 1 or B points to his best candidate, and should give 0 or A points to his worst candidate.
The focus in this paper is on elections with large numbers of voters, and so we shall look at the limits of such equilibria as the expected number of voters n goes to infinity, holding fixed the other parameters of the Poisson voting game (K, T, u, r, C). Thus, we may say that a large equilibrium sequence of this structure (K, T, u, r, C) is any sequence of equilibria {(F ,J ,q )} of the finite n n n n64
voting games (K, T, u, r, n, C) such that the vectors (F ,J ,q ) are convergent to some limit (F,J,q) as n n n n64 in the sequence. We may also refer to this limit (F,J,q) as a large equilibrium of (K, T, u, r, C).
When the expected vote profile is nJ in a voting game of expected size n, any set M that is a n subset of Z(C) can be interpreted as an event that has probability P(M*nJ ) = 3 P(x*nJ ). n x0M n
We will be particularly interested in two kinds of events: the event that a particular candidate can win the election, and the event that there is a close race where one vote may make a pivotal difference between one candidate or another winning. So for each candidate i, let S(i) denote the event that candidate i is a winner or tied to win,
For any pair of candidates i and j and any ballot option c, let 7(c,i,j) denote the event that adding one 11 more ballot c could change the winner from i to j,
Let 7(i,j) denote the event that there is a close race between i and j such that one additional vote could pivotally change the winner from one to the other of these two candidates,
Let D denote the set of pairs of candidates {i,j} who are distinguishable by the voters, in the sense that voters are not completely indifferent between them, D = {{i,j}* u (t) = / u (t) for some t in T}.
i j Let 7* denote the event that a close race exists where one additional vote could be pivotal between some pair of distinguishable candidates,
Notice that a rational voter cares about his vote only in the event that there is at least one close race among distinguishable candidates, so that his vote could make a difference. That is,
So even though the probability of a close race may be quite small when n is large, rational voters would act the same if all probabilities were replaced by conditional probabilities given the event 7* that a close race exists. There must be some pairs of candidates for which the conditional probability of being in a close race given 7* has a positive limit (or limit supremum) in any large equilibrium sequence. So for any two candidates {i,j}, we may say that the {i,j}-race is serious in a large equilibrium sequence iff i and j are distinguishable and 12 limsup P(7(i,j)*nJ )'P(7**nJ ) > 0.
That is, the race between i and j is serious if, in the event that a close race exists in the election, the conditional probability that i and j are in this close race has a positive limit as the expected population gets large. Any race that is not serious becomes of infinitesimal importance relative to the serious races, as n64, in the rational voters' expected-utility maximization problems.
In a large equilibrium sequence, we may say that a candidate i is serious iff there is some other candidate j such that the {i,j} race is serious. We may also say that a candidate i is out of contention in a large equilibrium iff the candidate is not serious. We say that a large equilibrium is discriminatory iff there is a candidate in K who is not serious. So discriminatory equilibria represent situations in which the voters perceive great differences in the chances of different candidates, so that some candidates lose virtually all significance in the voters' decision-making.
Notice that a serious candidate is not necessarily likely to win. We may say that a candidate i is strong in a large equilibrium sequence {(F ,J ,q )} if the probability of i winning has a positive limit n n n n64 q(i) > 0. In the winner-take-all voting games that are considered here, any strong candidate will be serious, but a serious candidate might not be a strong candidate.
Computing magnitudes and probability ratios of events in large voting games
The probability of any close race will generally tend to zero as the expected population n becomes large. But we can identify which races are serious in a large equilibrium by comparing the rates at which their probabilities go to zero. These rates can be usefully measured by a concept of magnitude defined as follows.
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Given a large equilibrium sequence {(F ,J ,q )} , the magnitude of an event M is n n n n64 µ(M) = lim log(P(M*nJ ))'n.
n64 n (Here, log denotes the natural logarithm, base e.) In particular, for any candidates i and j, we let µ i denote the magnitude of candidate i winning, µ = µ(S(i)) = lim log(P(S(i)*nJ ))'n, i n64 n and we let µ denote the magnitude of a close race between i and j, i,j µ = µ(7(i,j)) = lim log(P(7(i,j)*nJ ))'n.
i,j n64 n So if we can show that a close race between one pair of distinguishable candidates has a magnitude that is strictly greater than the magnitude of a close race between another pair of candidates, then the latter race is not serious. This fact can give us a practical way to identify the serious races, once we have learned how to compute these magnitudes.
The key to computing magnitudes is given summarized by the magnitude theorem from [9] . To state this theorem, we need some notation. For any positive number 2, let
and let R(0) = !1. Then R is concave, is maximized at R(1) = 0, and has slope RN(2) = !log(2).
We say that " = ("(c)) is the offset-ratio vector of a vote profile x, relative to the expected Writing nJ " = (nJ (c)"(c)) , we have " 0 M'(nJ ) iff nJ " 0 M.
These definitions are useful because, for any sequence of vote profiles {x } such that n n64 lim x (c)'(nJ (c)) = "(c) and lim J (c) = J(c), oec0C, n64 n n n64 n the magnitude of this sequence is Magnitude Theorem. Given M f Z(C), the magnitude of M is µ(M) = lim log(P(M*nJ ))'n = lim max log(P(y *nJ ))'n n64 n n64 n n y 0M n = lim max 3 J (c)R(" (c)). Proof. By the first-order conditions at the dual optimum 8, we must have, for each j in J,
So the letting "(c) = exp(3 8 b (c)) and x(c) = nJ(c)"(c), oec0C, k0J k k yields a vote profile x that satisfies the cone inequalities. But now consider changing the offset ratios from " in any direction * that keeps us in the cone. The objective function of the magnitude problem is concave, and its derivative at " in the direction * is
because staying in the cone when the offset ratios change from " to "+* implies that As an application of this result, consider the event M where the number of votes in a set G is not more than some fraction 2 of the total number of votes in a larger set H, where
Let 0 and ( denote the limiting expected fractions of voters choosing ballots in H\G and G,
So we get the dual magnitude problem
If 02 > ((1!2), then the optimal solution is 8=0, and the event M has magnitude µ(M) = 0, which is achieved at the expected vote profile where all offset ratios "(c) are 1. But when ((1!2) $ 02, the first order condition for an optimal 8 gives us 0 = 02e + ((2!1)e , and so e = ((1!2)'(02) $ 1.
Then the magnitude of M is
This magnitude is achieved at vote profiles in M where the offset ratios are In particular, the event of zero turnout in the election (that is, the vote profile x such that all x(c)=0) has magnitude !1. (Indeed, the probability of 0 is e for a Poisson random variable with !n mean n.) But the cone events considered here all include the zero vector in Z(C), and so their magnitudes cannot be less than !1. Also, the magnitudes of these events cannot be greater than 0, because the natural logarithm of a probability is never positive. Denoting the expected vote profile by T = (T(c)) (instead of nJ ), we can express the c0C n sensitivity of P(x*T) to the expected vote profile T by the formula
The highest possible magnitude of 0 holds for an event that includes points x such that the voters have strict preferences on {i,j} and neither i nor j is expected to be unanimously preferred over the other, then a discriminatory large equilibrium sequence exists in which {i,j} is the only serious race.
Proof. It suffices to consider {i,j} = {1,2}. In a discriminatory equilibrium, each voter will want to maximize his probability of making an impact on the serious race, by giving one point to the candidate in {1,2} whom he prefers, and giving zero points to the candidate in {1,2} whom he does not prefer. So all voters must be expected to choose among the four ballots
(1,0,A), (1,0,B), (0,1,A), (0,1,B).
When there are m voters, the total points of candidates 1 and 2 always sum to m with this strategy, and so the high scorer among 1 and 2 never has less than m/2 total points. But candidate 3 always has less than m/2 total points because A # B < 1/2. So candidate 3 cannot win or be in a close race with any positive fraction of the large expected turnout. Thus the pivot magnitudes µ and µ are both !1. This condition confirms the existence of a discriminatory equilibrium in which candidate 3 is not serious.
Q.E.D.
To illustrate this proposition, let us consider as Example 1 a simple voting game where existence of discriminatory equilibria seems very undesirable from a social-choice perspective. In this game there are three candidates, K = {1,2,3}, and there are two types of voters T = {1,2}. (We use boldface here for type values, to make them easier to distinguish from candidates' names.) Any randomly sampled voter is equally likely to be type 1 or 2, so r(1) = 0.5 = r(2).
The utility values are u(1) = (6,0,9), u(2) = (0,6,9).
So type 1 voters prefer candidate 1 over candidate 2, and type 2 voters prefer candidate 2 over candidate 1, but all voters prefer candidate 3 over both candidates 1 and 2. We may call this game "Above the Fray", to indicate something of candidate 3's superior position in the contest.
Under plurality voting or any (A,B)-scoring rule such that B < 0.5, we can find a discriminatory equilibrium in which candidate 3 is not serious. In this equilibrium, each voter wants to maximize his 21 impact for the serious candidate that he prefers against the other serious candidate in {1,2}, but still wants to give the admired nonserious candidate 3 as many points as possible (B) subject to the constraint of achieving this maximal impact on the serious race. So the equilibrium strategy F and expected vote distribution J satisfy Under any (A,B) scoring rule, this example also has a good equilibrium in which 3 is serious, everyone votes (A,0,1) or (0,A,1), and the good candidate 3 wins with probability one. We can show that this good equilibrium is unique under approval voting and negative voting. This unique approval-voting equilibrium uses only single-point ballots that are also feasible in plurality voting, but the equilibrium set under approval voting is significantly different from the equilibrium set under plurality voting, which also includes the bad discriminatory equilibrium.
It is even easier to show that this good equilibrium is unique under negative voting, where A=B=1. Under negative voting, casting a (1,1,0) ballot against the most-preferred candidate 3 would be dominated for any voter in this example, and so J(0,1,1)+J(1,0,1) = 1 in any equilibrium. The limiting expected vote share J(0,1,1) against candidate 1 cannot be strictly less than the limiting 23 expected vote share J(1,0,1) against candidate 2, because then the only serious race would be {1,3}, which would make all voters would want to vote (0,1,1) against candidate 1. Similarly J(0,1,1) cannot be strictly greater than J(1,0,1), because then the only serious race would then be {2,3}, which would make all voters want to vote (1,0,1) against candidate 2. Thus in the limit of any large equilibrium sequence, we must have J(0,1,1) = J(1,0,1) = 0.5, which is achieved by the strategy function with F(1,0,1*1) = 1 = F(0,1,1*2).
It may be interesting to see how this argument for uniqueness under negative voting still applies when we modify this example by changing the expected fractions of types 1 and 2 to r(1) = 0.6, r(2) = 0.4.
In this modified example, the limiting expected vote shares against candidates 1 and 2 must still be J(0,1,1) = J(1,0,1) = 0.5, because otherwise the candidate in {1,2} who was expected to get fewer negative votes would be the only serious challenger to candidate 3, which would make everyone want to vote against him. So the expected vote distributions must have the form J (1,0,1) = 0.5 + g , J(0,1,1) = 0.5 ! g , n n n for all n, where g 60 as n64. With r(1) = 0.6, this expected vote distribution J can be achieved only n n if type 1 voters randomize between voting (1,0,1) and (0,1,1). In equilibrium, g must be just large n enough to make type 1 voters indifferent between voting (0,1,1) against 1 and voting (1,0,1) against 2, even though they actually prefer 1 over 2. With u(1) = (6,0,9), type 1 voters would be willing to so randomize only if P(7((0,1,1),1,3)*nJ )'P(7((1,0,1),2,3)*nJ ) = (9!0)'(9!6) = 3.
n n
That is, 1's expected lead over 2 must make the probability of candidate 1 winning in a close {1,3} 24 race three times larger than the probability of candidate 2 winning in a close {2,3} race. In the limit of these equilibria J , all probability in 7((0,1,1),1,3) becomes concentrated where the offset ratios are n "(1,0,1) = 1 and "(0,1,1) = 0, because the votes against 1 must disappear to make a close {1,3} race.
The partial-derivative formula (5) in Section 3 then implies Mlog(P (7((0,1,1) ,1,3)*nJ ))'Mg = n("(1,0,1)!1) + (!n)("(0,1,1)!1) = n.
n n Similarly, all probability in 7((1,0,1),2,3) becomes concentrated where the offset ratios are "(1,0,1) = 0 and "(0,1,1) = 1, because (1,0,1) votes must disappear in a close {2,3} race, and so
When g is 0, log(P(7((0,1,1),1,3)*nJ ))!log(P(7((1,0,1),2,3)*nJ )) is 0, by symmetry. So to make n n n log(P(7(1,3)*nJ ))!log(P(7(2,3)*nJ )) equal to log(3), we need (n ! !n)g = log(3). Thus, g must n n n n be 0.55'n in a large equilibrium sequence for this modified example.
Problems of too few discriminatory equilibria: One Bad Apple
We saw in the preceding section that best-rewarding rules like plurality voting can easily generate discriminatory equilibria that sometimes seem problematic or undesirable. Our next proposition shows how worst-punishing rules like negative voting frequently do not yield any discriminatory equilibria, which can also be problematic. (Recall that A is the lower bound on the number of points that a voter can give to the middle-ranked candidate on his ballot.) Proposition 2. For any (A,B)-scoring rule with A $ 0.5, if all voters have strict preferences over the three candidates then discriminatory equilibrium sequences do not exist.
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Proof. Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that we have a discriminatory large equilibrium sequence in which {1,2} is the only serious race. In such equilibria, for all large n, each voter would want to maximize his probability of making an impact on the serious race, and so all voters must be expected to choose among the four ballots (1,0,A), (1,0,B), (0,1,A), (0,1,B).
So when candidates 1 and 2 have equal scores, they must each get an average of 0.5 points per voter.
But candidate 3 in such a scenario would have a score of at least A $ 0.5 points per voter, and so candidate 3 could never get fewer points than the low scorer among 1 and 2. Thus candidate 3 could never be more than one vote away from winning in a close {1,2} race. So the probability of a close race involving 3 cannot be less than the probability of a close {1,2} race, which contradicts the assumption that candidate 3 is not serious. Q.E.D.
To illustrate the implications of Proposition 2, let us consider now as Example 2 a simple voting game where absence of discriminatory equilibria seems undesirable from a social choice perspective.
In this game, there are again three candidates K = {1,2,3}, and two types of voters T = {1,2}, and any randomly sampled voter is equally likely to be type 1 or 2, r(1) = 0.5 = r(2).
The utility values in this example are u(1) = (9,6,0), u(2) = (6,9,0).
So again, type 1 voters prefer candidate 1 over candidate 2, and type 2 voters prefer candidate 2 over candidate 1, but now all voters prefer both candidates 1 and 2 over candidate 3. We may call this game "One Bad Apple", because our concern is that the presence of one universally undesirable 26 candidate may in some way spoil the whole election, as one rotten apple can spoil a whole barrel of apples.
In this example, the majority-preferred outcome can be guaranteed only if there exists a discriminatory equilibrium where candidate 3 is not serious, and Proposition 2 tells us that this equilibrium cannot exist unless A < 0.5. Indeed, when A < 0.5, this example has a discriminatory large equilibrium where So each candidate's expected score in the limit is 2/3 points per voter, and all three races have magnitude 0 and are serious. Thus, even though all voters dislike candidate 3 in this example, 27 candidate 3 must be a serious candidate in a large equilibrium under negative voting.
We may now ask how likely the bad candidate 3 is to actually win the election in this large equilibrium under negative voting. Just because all candidates have equal expected scores per voter in the limit does not imply that they have equal chance of winning in large equilibria, because their expected scores can converge differently to 2/3, from above or below.
If all three close races were equally likely in this example then, under negative voting, the voters would all vote sincerely against candidate 3. To induce some voters of each type to vote against their second-favorite candidate in {1,2}, the probability of a close {1,2} race must be somewhat greater than either race involving 3, which can happen if, for large finite n, the expected fraction of votes against 3 is slightly larger than 1/3 while the expected fraction of votes against 1 and 2 are each slightly less than 1/3. Because the possible pivot events 7(c,i,j) all occur here with offset ratios approaching 1, we can use the Normal approximation to estimate their probabilities, and the probability of any possible pivot event 7(c,i,j) is essentially the same as the probability of candidates i and j being tied for first place (in the sense that the ratio of these probabilities goes to 1 as n64, by the offset theorem). So,
given any large n, let p denote the probability of i and j being tied for first place. To make type 1 ij voters indifferent between voting (1,1,0) against 3 and voting (1,0,1) against 2, these probabilities must satisfy (9!0)p + (6!0)p = (9!6)p + (0!6)p . That is, the probability of a close {1,3} race and the probability of a close {2,3} race must each be 1/7
of the probability of a close {1,2} race. So for any large n (noting the symmetry among candidates 1 and 2 in this game), we may look for an equilibrium of the form F (1,0,1*1) = 2/3!g = F (0,1,1*2), F (1,1,0*1) = 1/3+g =F (1,1,0*2) n n n n n n which gives us the expected vote distribution
Near the expected vote profile, the numbers x(c) for each ballot option c can be approximated as the integer-roundings of independent Normal random variables with mean and variance both equal to nJ (c). From this random vector x, we define n z = (x(1,0,1) ! x(0,1,1))' , z = (x(1,1,0) ! x(0,1,1))' . 2 3 The joint distribution of z and z is approximately Multivariate-Norma1, with means E(z ) = 0 and Similarly, 1 and 3 are tied for first place when z is between !0.5' and 0.5' and z is positive. But the great impossibility theorems of social choice theory tell us that majority-rule outcomes cannot be defined for all social choice situations. The Condorcet cycle example is the simplest and best-known of these situations where majority-rule outcomes do not exist. In this section, we consider a version of this Condorcet cycle, to show that, even when "majority rule" is not well-defined, we can still find systematic differences among voting rules in terms of their tendency to admit discriminatory equilibria. The symmetries of the candidates and types in this example imply that the voting game must always have a symmetric equilibrium in which each candidate has the same 1/3 probability of winning, and each pair of candidates is equally likely to be in a close race. In such a symmetric equilibrium, each voter should vote sincerely, giving 1 point to his most-preferred candidate, 0 points to his worst candidate, and B points to his middle candidate. (The choice is B rather than A for the middle candidate, because we have assumed that each voter would prefer the middle candidate when the other choice is equally likely to be the best or worst candidate.)
So let us consider as
The main question of this section is to characterize the scoring rules such that this Condorcet cycle also has discriminatory equilibria which break the symmetry of the candidates. So let us look for discriminatory equilibria in which, say, candidate 3 is not serious. If {1,2} were the only serious race, then type 1 voters would all vote (1,0,A) (because they prefer 1 over 2 but think 3 is worst), type 3 voters would all vote (1,0,B) (because they also prefer 1 over 2 but think 3 is best), and type 2 voters in the limit of any discriminatory equilibrium sequence where 3 is not serious.
The decision of the type 2 voters will depend on whether a close race involving candidate 3 is more likely to be with 1 or with 2. We have assumed that u (2)!u (2) is more than u (2)!u (2), and
so the type 2 voters should be more concerned about influencing a {1,3} race (where they would prefer to vote (0,1,B)) than about influencing a {2,3} race (where they would prefer to vote (0,1,A)) unless a close {2,3} race is much more likely than a close {1,3} race.
But we now claim that a close {2,3} race cannot be more likely than a close {1,3} race in a discriminatory equilibrium where 3 is not serious, so that the type 2 voters should all vote (0,1,B), This curve is shown in Figure 1 as a dark solid curve. For (A,B)-scoring rules below this curve, we can find discriminatory equilibria of this Condorcet cycle example such that any single candidate is out of contention. These scoring rules include the best-rewarding rules like plurality voting.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
So when voters in the Condorcet cycle use plurality voting or any of the best-rewarding rules below this curve, the symmetry of the Condorcet cycle can be broken in equilibrium. A perception that one candidate is not serious can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, so that the next candidate in the cycle 1>2>3>1 will be almost sure to win the election. Thus, a candidate i's success in the election may depend on manipulation of the voters' perceptions, to get them to focus on the equilibrium in which the candidate who can beat i is not taken seriously.
On the other hand, when voters in the Condorcet cycle use a rule above this curve, such as approval voting or negative voting, all three candidates must always be taken seriously as contenders to win the election. Proof. In the case where A > 0, it can happen that the type 1 voters have a slight majority, but the type 1 voters all vote (1,A,0) and the type 2 voters all vote (0,1,B), making candidate 2 the winner.
In the case where A = 0 and B < 1, it can happen that the type 2 voters have a slight majority, but the type 1 voters all vote (1,0,0) and the type 2 voters split equally among (0,1,B) and (0,B,1), making candidate 1 the winner. But in the equilibrium under approval voting, with A=0 and B=1, each candidate gets as many points as there are voters who prefer him, and so the set of voters who prefer the winner cannot be a strict minority. Q.E.D.
In this symmetric equilibrium, the expected score for the candidate 1 is r(1) points per voter, and the expected score for candidates 2 and 3 is (r(1)A+(1!r(1))(1+B))'2. So 1's expected score is largest, and the probability of candidate 1 winning goes to one as n64, when r(1) > (1+B)'(3+B!A).
Conversely, 1's expected score is lowest, and the probability of candidate 1 winning goes to 0 as n64, when r(1) < (1+B)'(3+B!A). This quantity (1+B)'(3+B!A) is Cox's threshold of diversity for (A,B)-scoring rules with 3 candidates (see Cox [2, 3] and Myerson [6] ).
Consider now the (A,B)-scoring rules where A + B < 1. (These include the best-rewarding rules like plurality voting.) Under such voting rules, the expected fraction of type 1 voters can satisfy 1/2 > r(1) > (1+B)'(3+B!A), and then the probability of a majority with two candidates both losing 37 the election approaches one as n64. Thus, a majority bloc of voters may be weakened by having duplicate candidates under best-rewarding rules like plurality voting.
Consider now the (A,B)-scoring rules where A + B > 1. (These include the worst-punishing rules like negative voting.) Under such voting rules, the expected fraction of type 1 voters can satisfy 1/2 < r(1) < (1+B)'(3+B!A), and then the probability that a minority with two candidates has a winner of the election approaches one as n64. So a minority bloc of voters may be strengthened by having duplicate candidates under worst-punishing rules like negative voting.
Under (A,B)-scoring rules where A + B = 1, the probability of nonmajoritarian outcomes in the symmetric equilibria of Proposition 3 goes to zero as n64. So the possible failure of majority rule for symmetric equilibria of this simple bipolar example does not seem very problematic under such rules that are well balanced between best-rewarding and worst-punishing.
Efficient majoritarian outcomes in more general bipolar elections with corruption
In the simple model of the previous section, we could apply the criterion of majoritarianism but not Pareto-efficiency because, among any two distinguishable candidates, the better candidate for one type of voter was always worse for the other type. We now consider a more general bipolar model in which both efficiency and majoritarianism can be tested, and we show that approval voting passes both tests. In this analysis, we extend the results of [5] to the Poisson framework (and the proof here is easier than in the original framework).
As before, suppose that there are two types of voters T = {1,2}. We assume now that the type 1 voters are expected to form a strict majority, with 0. 
